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IRVINE

v.

GIBSON.

[19 C. (2d)

Nov. 1941.]

valuable effort and time, as well as money presenting the
case, and a decision thereon has been rendered on the merits
by the District Court of Appeal, and a hearing granted by
this court. While it may be true as a general rule that this
court in its discretion may refuse to issue the writ for the
reasons advanced in the majority opinion, I believe that under
the circumstances here presented, technicalities and form
should give way to considerations of public importance and
fair treatment of counsel and the litigants here involved. No
useful purpose can be served by compelling' the parties to
litigate the cause anew in the superior court. An appeal
would in all probability be taken from any judgment entered
therein. The whole subject would have to be again briefed
and presented to an appellate court and a decision prepared
by the latter. To require that unnecessary delay and repetition is not consonant with the function of courts or with the
worthy policy of speeding up the judicial machinery to the
end that justice shall be a reality rather than a myth.
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Nov. 14, 1941.]

AGATHA ARCHER et aI., Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS
'ANGELES (a Municipal Corporation) et aI., Respondents.
[L. A. No. 17612.

In Bank.

Nov. 14, 1941.]

JAMES L. ALLISON et aI., Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS
ANGELES (a Municipal Corporation) et aI., Respondents.
[1] Dismissal-Upon Failure of Proof-When Motion Granted.-

Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied December 11, 1941. Shenk~, J., and Carter J., voted for a rehearing.
~

A nonsuit should be granted only when, accepting 'the full
force of the evidence adduced, together with ev:ery reasonable
inference favorable to the plaintiff, and excluding all evidence
in conflict therewith, it appears that the plaintiff is precluded
from recovering a judgment.
[2] Constitutional Law-Police POlwer-Right to Damages.-The
state or its subdivisions may take or damage private property:
without compensation if such action :isessential to safeguard
public health, safety or morals, but in certain' circumstances
the taking or damaging of private property for such a purpose
is not prompted by so great a necessity as to be justified without proper compensation to the owner.
[3] Eminent Domain-Compensation-Necessity for and Right to-State Constitutional Guaranty.-The liability of the state'
under Const. art. I, § 14, for compensation to the owner of
private property taken for public use, arises when the taking
or damaging is not so essential to the general welfare as
to be sanctioned under the police power, and the injury is one'
that would give rise to a cause of action by the owner independently of the constitutional provisions.
[4] ld.-Compensation - Damnum Absque lnjuria.-Const; 'art.
I, § 14, which permits an action against the state to recover
damages for the taking of private property for public use, is '
designed merely to give a remedy for a cause of action that
[2] See 5 Cal. Jur. 696; 11 Am. Jur. 1003.
[3] See 10 Cal. Jur. 283, 295, 328; 18 Am. Jur. 751.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Dismissal, Discontinuance and Nonsuit, § 75; [2] Constitutional Law, § 97; [3] Eminent Domain,
§43 (1); [4] Eminent Domain, §47; [5,8-10] Waters, §396;
[6] Waters, §400; [7] Waters, §393; [11] Waters, §273; [12]
Waters, §§ 31, 411; [13] Appeal and Error, § 1337.
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[11] Id.-Interference of Third Parties-Obstructions-Darilage!
Any damage caused by an obstruction to thenaturalflo~
of waters is actionable.
[12] Id.-Surface Waters - Actions - Evidence - Cause of Injuries: Ownership of Land-Protection Against Avulsion.A landowner cannot recover damages for flooding: by reason
of an obstruction in a lagoon created by a bridge constructed
by public bodies which allegedly caught debris,where plaintiff's own testimony showed that the flooding was, caused by
the inadequacy of the outlet and that it could have occurred
regardless of any obstruction created by the bridge. Nor ,can
liability be imposed merely because the bridge bulkheads
might have prevented the water from widening the channel
by washing away the banks, since a riparian may erect structures along the banks of a stream to protect h~s' lands.
[13] Appeal-Review-Successive Appeals-Questions Concluded
-Sufficiency of Pleadings-Effect on Nonsuit.-A determination on appeal as to the sufficiency of a complaint to state
a cause of action does not on a subsequent appeal require the
reversal of a judgment of nonsuit where the evidence does not
sustain the cause of action alleged.
.

[5] Waters - Surface Waters - Protection Against -'- Confining
Waters-Improvements in Stream.-A lower owner has no
right of redress for injury to his land caused by improvements
made in the stream for the purpose of draining and protecting
the land above, even though the channel is inadequate to
accommodate the increased flow of water resulting from the
improvements. ' .
.

[10] Id.-Surface Waters-Protection Against-Confining Waters
-Discharge into Stream-Natural Drainage.-vVhile a landowner may not collect surface waters and discharge them
upon adjacent land, he may discharge them for a reasonable
purpose into a stream into which they naturally drain without
incurring liability for damage to the lower land caused by the
increased flow of the stream.

CITY

[19 C. (2d) 19]

would otherwise exist. The state is not liable under such
provision for an injury that is damnum absq~te injuria.

[6] Id.-Surface Waters-Protection Against-Public Improve-.
ments - Drainage of Surface Waters.-Where a city, a county
and a flood control district, acting independently, straightened,
widened and deepened a creek and its tributaries which constituted the natural outlet for surface \vaters, and constructed
concrete storm drains in the draina~:e area, they were under
no duty to improve a lagoon into \vhich the creek emptied.
Such agencies cannot be held negligent for doing v{hat they
had a right to do, even though a different plan might have
avoided damage to property along the lagoon when the ,Yaters,
because of an inadequate outlet, flooded such property.
[7] Id. - Surface Waters - Protection Against - Discharging
Water on to Neighboring Land-Diversion Out of Natural
Channel.:..-Drainage improvements must follow the natural
drainage of the country. If water is diverted out of its natural channel and discharged into a diiferent channel or upon
neighboring land, the diverter is liable to the owner whose
land is injured by such discharge.
[8] Id.-Surface Waters-Protection Against-Confining Waters
- Improvements in Stream - As Diver8ion. - Straightening,
widening or deepening the channel of a stream to improve
drainage entails 110 diversion of the wateI'S therein.
[9] Id.-Surface Waters-Protecti011 Against-Confining Waters
-Discharge into Inadequate Channel as Diversion.-rrherc is
no diversion of surface waters if such waters, flowing in no
defined channel, are for a reasonable purpose gathered together and discharged into the stream that is their natural
means of drainage, even though the stream channel is inadequate to accommodate the increased flow.

ARCHER V.

("

APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Frank G. Swain, Judge. Affirmed.
Consolidated' actions for damages for flooding of plaintiffs'
lands predicated upon negligence in constructing a drainage
system with an inadequate outlet, etc .. Judgments of nonsuit
for defendants affirmed.
Dempster & Dempster, Grace Dempster, J. H. Creighton
and Jerrell Babb for Appellants.
Hibbard & Kleindienst, Hill, .l\1:organ & Bledsoe, Charles
P. McCarthy, Julius V. Patrosso, Earle M. Daniels, Bartlett
& Kearney, Harry J. McClean, Irsreld & Irsfeld, Latham &
Watkins, Freston & li-'iles, Chase, Barnes & Chase and Henry
M. Lee, as Amici Curiae, on behalf of Appellants.
E,verett W. Mattoon and J. H. 0 'Connor, County Counsel,
S. V. O. Prichard, Assistant County Counsel, J. H. Moroney,
Deputy County Counsel, Ray L. Chesebro, City Attorney,
[12]

See 25 Cal. Jur. 1051; 27 R. C. L; 1139;
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Frederick von Schrader and Leon T. David, Assistants City
Attorney, and Howard E. Crandall and Henry C. Ramsey,
Deputies City Attorney, for Respondents.

'i:

TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiffs own land in Venice, a suburb of
the city of Los Angeles. The land is located near La Ballona
Lagoon, a body of water about two miles long and two miles
wide, which empties into the Pacific Ocean and is fed by
La Ballona Creek, a natural watercourse draining an area
of about 134 square miles. A map of the area as it existed
in 1893 shows that the waters descending from the hills followed no defined course until they reached lower La Bal10na
Creek. In the ensuing years, however, the area drained by
the creek and its tributaries was transformed into residential
a.nd business districts and the waters were gradually confined
to ditches and channels emptying into the creek. The city
of Los Angeles, the Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist.rict, and the county of Los Angeles, acting independently,
straightened, widened, and deepened the creek and its tributaries and constructed concrete storm drains to improve the
drainage. The urbanization of the area resulted in less absorption of water into the earth, while the improved drainage
accelerated the flow of water into the lagoon. The outlet
from the lagoon into the ocean, however, was in no way
improved to accommodate the increased flow of water but remained in its natural state. Meanwhile several bridges were
constructed across the lagoon.
Throughout D€'cember 31, 1933, and January 1, 1934, a
heavy rainstorm occurred. The waters swept down La Ballona Creek and into the lagoon where, because of the inadequate outlet, they overflowed on to plaintiffs' properties,
flooding them to a depth of from six to eight feet for about
four days.
The plaintiffs thereupon brought these actions for damages
against the city, the county, and the flood control district.
They claim the right to recover from defendants under article
I, section 14 of the California Constitution which requires the
payment of just compensation for private property taken or
damaged for public use. The complaints allege that defendants acted negligently in constructing a drainage system with
an inadequate outlet, improperly permitted obstructions in
the lagoon, diverted water from streets within the drainage

~
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area on to plaintiffs' properties, and damaged plaintiffs'
property for a public use without making compensation.
A demurrer of the defendant flood control district to one
of the complaints was sustained without leave to amend, but
on appeal the District Court of Appeal reversed the judgment, holding that the complaint stated a good cause of
action. (Archer v. City of Los Angeles, 15 Cal. App. (2d)
520 [59 Pac. (2d) 605].) The actioI1;s were then consolidated
for trial. A.t the conclusion of plaintiffs' evidence, the trial
court entered judgments of nonsuit in favor of defendants,
and plaintiffs have appealed.
[1] It is settled that" A nonsuit should be granted only
when, accepting the full force of the evidence adduced, together with every reasonable inference favorable to the
plaintiff, which may be drawn therefrom, and excluding all
evidence in conflict therewith, it still appears that the law
precludes the plaintiff from recovering a judgment. . . . "
(Mastrangelo v. West Side U. H. School Dist., 2 Cal. (2d) 540,
544 [42 Pac. (2d) 634]; Angelus Sec. Oorp. v. Ball, 20 Cal.
App. (2d) 423, 435 [67 Pac. (2d) 152].) Plaintiffs have
established by their evidence that defendants straightened
and widened the channel of L'a Ballona Creek and constructed
concrete storm drains that followed the natural drainage of
the country; that these improvements accelerated the flow of
the water; that the outlet into the ocean remained unimproved and could not accommodate the increased flow; that
the defendants had knowledge of the' inadequacy of. the outlet; that in the opinion of two expe.rts such a drainage system
was "not good engineering"; and that the flow of water
was obstructed by several bridges acrq$S the lagoon including
one constructed by the city.
.
The question presented is whether a governmental agency
is liable under article I, section 14, for damaging property'
for a public use when improvements constructed by it along
the natural course of a stream and its tributaries accelerate
the flow of the water, and lower lands are flooded because
of the inadequacy, known to the agency, of the outlet to
accommodate the increased flow.
[2] The state or its subdivisions may take or damage private property without compensation if such action is essential to safeguard public health, safety, or morals. (Gray' v.
-,)

,
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Reclamation Dist., 174 Cal. 622 [163 Pac. 1024] at 640;,
Bowditch v. Boston, ]01 U. S. 16 [25 L. Ed. 980J; Ohicago
B. £& Q. R. R. Co. v. Ill'inois, 200 U. S. 561 [26 Sup. Ct. 341, 50
L. Ed. 596J; Omnia Commercial 00. v. United States, 261
U. S. 502 [43 Sup. Ct. 437, 67 L. Ed. 773] ; see cases cited
5 Cal. JUl'. 696 et seq.) In certain circumstances, however,
the taking or damaging of priv9.te property for such a purpose is not prompted by so great a necessity as to be justified without proper compensation to tile owner. (Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393 [43 Sup. Ct. 158, 67
L. Ed. 322] ; Chicago B. £& Q. R. R. 00. v. Chicago, 166 U. S:
~26 [17 Sup. Ct. 581, 41 L. Ed. 979]; see cases cited in
10 Cal. JUl'. 283, 284, 295.) [3] The liability of the state
under article I, section 14 of the California Constitution
arises when the taking or damaging of private property is not
so essential to the general welfare as to be sanctioned under
the "police power" (Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra;
Ohicago B. &Q. R. R. 00. v. Ohicago, supra; 10 Cal. Jur.,
supra; see M'tlgler v. K.ansas, 123 U. S. 623 [8 Sup. Ct. 273,
31 L. Ed. 205]), and the injury is one that would give rise
to a cause of action on the part of the owner independently
of the constitutional provision. (Lamb v. Reclamation Dist;,
73 Cal. 125, ]29-131 [14 Pac. 625, 2 Am. St. Rep. 775] ; San
Gabriel Valley Ootmt1'y Olub v. Oottnty of Los Angeles, 182
Cal. 392 [188 Pac. 554, 9 A. L. R. 1200] ; Jefferson Oounty
Drainage Dist. v. '.McFaddin, (Tex. Civ. App.) 291 S. W. 322.)
[4] 'The provision permits an action against the state, which
cannot be sued without its consent. It is designed, not to
create new causes of action, but to give a remedy for a cause
of action that would otherwise exist. The state is therefore
:not liable under this provision for an injury that is damnum
absque inj1{'ria. If the property owner would have no cause
of action were a private person to inflict the damage, he can
have no claim for compensation from the state. (Lamb v.
Reclamation Dist., supra, 129-131; San Gabriel Valley
Oountry Ol'ub v. Oounty of Los Angeles, supra; Jefferson
Oounty Drainage Dist. v. McFaddin, supra.) In the present
'case, therefore, plaintiffs have no right to compensation under
article I, section 14, if the injury is one that a private party
'would have the right to inflict without incurring liability.
[5] It is established in California and other jurisdictions
that a lower owner has no right of redress for injury to

c.
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his land caused' by improvements made in',tlie,::,stream,'i'fdr
the purpose of draining or protecting. the land 'abov'e~\
though the channel is inadequate to accommodat'e' ,th~;:i,f
'creased flow of water resulting from the improvemen\t~'.
(San Gabriel Valley Country Club v. Count1Fof Los'Angetd,
S'llpra; Board of Drainage Com'rs. v. Board of Draind,ge
Com'rs., 130 Miss. 764 [95 So. 75, 28 A. L. R. 1250] ; Mizell
v. McGowan, 129 N. C. 9,3 [39 S. E. 729, 85Afu. St. Rep.
705] ; O'Donnell v. City of Syracuse, 184 N. Y.l~t76 N.'E.
738, 112 Am. St. Rep. 558, 3 L. R. A.(N. S.)1053f; Oity
of Hamilton v. Ashbrook, 62 Ohio 511 [57N~ E. 2391';
Lessenger v. City of Harlan, 184 Iowa 172 [168 N. :W. 803,
5 A. L. R. 1523] ; Strauss v. Allentown, 215 Pac: 96 '163 Atl.'
1073, 7 Ann. Cas. 686]; Peck v. Herrington,}09 IlL 611,
50 Am. Rep. 627] ; Jefferson Oounty Drainag~Dist. v.'McFaddin, supraj City of Ludlow v. Broaerick, 181 Ky.
123 [203 S. W. 1082] ; Manteufel v. Wetzel; 133 Wis. 619
[114 N; W. 91, ]9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 167]; TrilJrJv. Timmerman, 90 Wash. 678 [156 Pac. 846, L. R. A. 1916F, 424] ;
Robb v. Village of La Grange, 158 Ill. 21 [42N. E. 77].)
In the San Gabriel Valley Country Club case Los Angeles
County constructed concrete storm drains that followed the
(' natural drainage of the country, accelerated the flow of
water, and prevented its absorption by adjoining lands. As
a result plaintiff's land, situated below the point where the
drains emptied into the stream, was damaged during a heavy
rain storm. In holding that plaintiff had no right of recovery against the county this court stated (at page 406) ':
" . . . an improvement for the purposes of the drainage and
'protection of lands above does not give a lower riparian
'owner on the stream a cause of action merely because such
improvement increases the volume of water in the stream as
it comes to his land, even though the burden he is necessarily
under of protecting his land against the stream is thereby
increased and his land is injured because of his failure to
,meet such increased burden; . . . the rule is not subject
to the limitation that the increased volume must not be such
,as to make the stream exceed the capacity of its channel."
[6] Accordingly, the construction of the improvements by
the defendants in the instant case did not place upon them
the duty of improving the outlet. They cannot be held negli.
, gent for doing what they had a right to do even though a

'even
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different plan might have avoided the damage. (Board of
Drainage Oom'rs. v. Board of Drainage Oom'rs., supra, at
81; Dudley v. Village of Buffalo, 73 Minn. 347 [76 N. W.
44, 45] ; Hamilton v. Ashbrook, supra, at 241; Lessenger v.
Oity of Harlan, supra, at 805.)
[7] The improvements must follow the natural drainage
of the country. If the water is diverted out of its natural
channel and discharged into a different channel or upon
neighboring land, the diverter is liable to the owner whose
land is injured by such discharge. (Shaw v. Sebastopol, 159
Cal. 623 [115 Pac. 213] ; Stanford v. San Francisco, 111 Cal.
198 [43 Pac. 605] ; Farrell v. City of Ontario, 39 Cal. App.
351 [178 Pac. 740], 36 Cal. App. 754 [173 Pac. 392] ; Dick
v. City of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. App. 724 [168 Pac. 703];
M1.llder v. Oity of Los Angeles, 110 Cal. App. 663 [294 Pac.
485] ; Newman v. City of Alhambra, 179 Cal. 42 [175 Pac.
414]; see 11 Cal. L. Rev. 444.) [8] In the present case,
however, there is no evidence of diversion. Straightening,
widening, or deepening the channel of a stream to improve
the drainage entails no diversion of the waters therein. (San
Gabriel Valley Oountry Olub v. County of Los Angeles,
supra; Lambert v. Alcorn, ]44 Ill. 313 [33 N. E. 53, 21
L. R. A. 611]; Gentry v. Weaver, 130 Kan. 691 [288 Pac.
745]; St. Paul &; D. R. Co. v. Duluth, 56 Minn. 494 [58
N. W. 159, 45 Am. St. Rep. 491, 23 L. R. A. 88] ; Fenton v.
Adams, 221 Ill. 201 [77 N. E. 531, ] 12 Am. St. Rep. 171] ;
see 67 C. J. 902.) [9] Likewise there is no diversion if
surface waters, flowing in no defined channel, are for a reasonable purpose gathered together and discharged into the
stream that is their natural means of drainage even though
the stream channel is inadequate to accommodate the increased flow. (San Gabriel Valley Oountry Club v. County
of Los Angeles supra, 401, 402; Sheehan v. Flynn, 59 Minn.
436 [61 N. W. 462, 26 L. R. A. 632J; Board of Drainage
Com'rs. v. Board of Drainage Oom'rs., supra; Mizell v. McGowan, supra; Dudley v. Village of Buffalo, supra; Waffie v.
New York Central R. R. Co., 53 N. Y. 11 [13 Am. Rep. 467J ;
St. Paul &; D. R. 00. v. Duluth, supra; Oity of Hamilton v.
Ashbrook, supra; Lessenger v. City of Harlan, supra; Peck
v. Herrington, supra; Jefferson Oounty Drainage Dist. v.
McFaddin, supra; Manteufel v. vVetzel, supra; see Robb v.
Village of La Grange, supra; O'Donnell v. Oity of Syracuse,
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supra; Oity of Maysm1le v. Brooks, 145 Ky. 526 [140 S. W.
665]; see cases cited in 85 Am. St. Rep. 733, 734.) [10]
A California landowner may not collect stich waters and discharge them upon adjacent land (LeBrun v. Richards, 210
Cal. 308 [291 Pac. 825, 72 A. L. R. 336]), but he may discharge them for a reasonable purpose into the stream into
which they naturally drain without incurring liability for
damage to lower land caused by the increased flow of the
stream. As stated in San Gabriel Valley Oountry Olub v.
County of Los Angeles, supra, at pages 401, 402: "Not 'to
permit an upper land owner to protect his land against the
stream would be in many instances to destroy the possibility
of making the land available for improvement or settlement '
and condemn it to sterility and vacancy. Such a rule would
seriously interfere with the development of' the country.
Because of this, and because of the necessity of permitting
the utilization for drainage of the means afforded by nature
for the purpose, a very great preponderance of the decisions
In other states go further than it is necessary to go in this
case, and hold that a riparian owner has no right to complain
because the volume of water in the :stream is increased by
artificially draining surface waters into it above, provided
~ only the stream is the natural drainage channel for the
lands so drained. Furthermore, this rule is adopted regardless of whether the so-called common-law rule concerning
surface waters prevails in the particular jurisdiction or, as
here, the civil-law rule, which forbids the gathering together
of surface waters and discharging them as a stream upon
adjoining lands. If the surface waters are gathered and
discharged into the stream which is their natural means of
drainage, so that they come to the land below only as a part
of the stream, it is held that no action lies because of their
being added. (Citing cases.) Mr. Freeman in his note in
85 Am. St. Rep. 727, reviews very thoroughly the authorities
dealing with the right to accelerate or diminish the flow of'
water, and ,upon the particular point under discussion' says "
(page 733): 'We have just noticed the difference between'
merely draining on to another's land, and draihing into' a:
natural channel or watercourse, which flows across8uch'land;
So far as streams or natural watercourses are concerned, '
there can be no doubt that one can drain into them, and,
thereby increase their volume without subjecting himself to

28
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liability for any damage suffered by a lower owner.'" The
evidence here presented shows clearly that the storm drains
constructed by defendants either followed the channel of
natural streams (see Larrabee v. Cloverdale, 131 Cal. 96, 100
[63 Pac. 143]), or discharged into the creek surface waters
that would naturally drain into it.
[11] Any damage caused by an obstruction to the natural
flow of waters is also actionable (Richardson v. City of
Eureka, 96 Cal. 443 [31 Pac. 458]; Dick v. City of Los
Angeles, supra; Los Angeles Cemetery Ass'n v. Los Angeles,
103 Cal. 461 [37 Pac. 375] ; Conniff v. San Francisco. 67 Cal.
45 [7 Pac. 41] ; Larrabee v. Cloverdale, supra; Geurki'Y!k v.
City of Petaluma, 112 Cal. 306 [44 Pac. 570]), and plaintiffs
contend that several bridges and other structures obstructed
the flow of waters through the lagoon. [12] Their evidence shows that only one bridge was constructed by defendants. The basis of liability must therefore depend upon
this bridge. Plaintiffs' evidence establishes that this bridge
caught debris swept down into the lagoon and obstructed to '
some extent the flow of the waters. The testimony of plaintiffs' own experts makes it clear, however, that the flooding
of plaintiffs' land was caused by the inadequacy of the
outlet and would have occurred regardless of the obstruction created by the bridge. Plaintiffs have made no showing that the obstruction of the bridge contributed to the
damage caused by the overflow. No liability can be imposed
upon defendants merely because the bulkheads supporting
the banks on either side of the bridge might have prevented,
the water from forcibly widening the channel by washing
away the banks; for it is firmly established that a riparian
owner may erect bulkheads or other structures along the
banks of a stream to protect his land from being washed
away. (Barnes v. Marshall, 68 Cal. 569 [10 Pac. 115]; Weinberg Co. v. Bixby, 185 Cal. 87 [196 Pac. 25]; Horton v.
Goodenough, 184 Cal. 451 [194 Pac. 34] ; De Baker v. Southern Cal. Ry. Co., 106 Cal. 257, 279, 280 [39 Pac. 610, 46 Am.
St. Rep. 237] ; Lamb v. Reclamation Dist., 73 Cal. 125 [14
Pac. 625, 2 Am. St. Rep. 775] ; Sanguinetti v. Pock, 136 Cal.
466 [69 Pac. 98, 89 Am. St. Rep. 169]; see cases cited in
25 Cal. Jur. 1051, 1052, sec. 47; 26 Cal. Jur. 290-292, secs.
503-508.) The evidence presented by the plaintiffs in the
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instant case is therefore insufficient to establish a right to
recover against the defendants.
[13] Plaintiffs contend that the decision of the District
Court of Appeal, holding that their complaint stated a good
cause of action against a general demurrer, is the ,law of
the case and requires this court to reverse the .nonsuit of
the trial court. The District Court of Appeal stated that
," The gist of the. . . complaint . . . is that respondent
constructed and built an artificial drainage system. so defectively, carelessly and negligently that it would. not carry
the storm waters to the Pacific Ocean as 'designed and. intended" and "that the injury to the appellantsoccurredhy
reason of the fact that respondent. negligently turned'the
storm waters into La Ballona lagoon, which :'Yastoo small
to conduct the water turned into it by and; through ,the
drainage system constructed, operated and ,'maIntained: ,by
respondent. . . . "According to the' allegatibns"o:f the' coni:.
plaint, the damage resulted because defendants negligently
diverted water out of its natural chartnel,and' obstructed
the channel of the creek. Plaintiffs' 'evidence; however, falls
to substantiate such allegations. The decision 'of' the Dis.
trict Court of Appeal on demurrer is therefore not binding
on this court in passing on the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the allegations.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Edmonds, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
The statement of facts in these cases contained in the majority opinion is both incomplete and inaccurate and the legal
theory, upon which the decision is based is manifestly
sound and unsupported by respectable authority. 'The principles of law, if they may be called such, announced in the
majority opinion, are clearly contrary to the settled law of
California and the weight of authority elsewhere.
Since a correct statement of the facts is essential to the
proper determination of every law suit, I will first set forth
the facts as they appear in the record before us in these
cases.
Consolidated actions were brought to recover damages resulting from the overflow of storm waters upon the real prop-
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erty of the plaintiffs and their assignors located in Venice,
a suburb of the city of Los Angeles. At the close of plaintiffs' evidence, judgments of nonsuit were entered from
which the plaintiffs have. appealed.
The litigation concerns the drainage area of La Ballona
Creek, approximately twelve miles square, located in the
westerly part of Los Angeles County, and is bounded on the
north by the Santa Monica l\10untains and the Hollywood
Hills, on the south by the Baldwin Hills, on the east by
Vermont Avenue and on the west by Sepulveda Canyon and
the Pacific Ocean. Within the above-mentioned area are
situated the towns of Culver City, Beverly Hills and Palms,
and a portion of the defendant city of Los Angeles. The
entire area is a· part of the defendant Los Angeles County
Flood Control District.
It was agreed in the court below that the issue of liability or nonliability should be tried first. The evidence
regarding the development and urbanization of the area,
including changes in the methods of drainage, is voluminous
and technical. Briefly, when the watershed was in its
natural state much of the rain that fell into it never reached
the outlet at La Ballona Lagoon, a large submerged area
close to the Pacific Ocean which constituted its outlet. The
.drainage of the watershed extended over a wide area in
"thin sheets," and much of the water was absorbed in the
ground, lost by evaporation, or held by large lakes or swamps
and slow-moving streams. The development of the area
brought a gradual confinement of the drainage, and sections
which had once been absorptive, came to have a run-off themselves. The defendant city constructed thirteen concrete
storm drains, the defendant county three. These drains collected the surface waters. rrhe defendant flood control district built its structures in the middle reaches of La Ballona
Creek to deepen, widen and straighten the channel, and
constructed levees along the banks to confine the water to the
channel of the creek. These improvements followed the former natural watercourse and entailed no diversion of water
from without the watershed. They caused the water to run
off faster from the drainage area and increased the volume
flowing into La Ballona Lagoon, the main outlet into the
ocean. The surface water collected by the storm drains·
emptied into a large basin where the improvements ended
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some three miles east of the lagoon. The water in the basin
entered the lagoon at two places and flowed through it to
the only outlet into the ocean.
.
It is the contention of the plaintiffs that "by said operation and the inadequate outlet into the ocean a 'cul de sac'
was formed," which had the effect of impounding the storm
wa tel'S and causing them to overflow the banks of said lagoon.
On December 31, 1933, and January 1, 1934, a heavy rain
occurred and the storm waters went down La Ballona Creek
. and into the lagoon where they overflowed and flooded to a
depth of six to eight feet for about four days the properties
of the' plaintiffs and their assignors located some three miles
north of the lagoon or main outlet into the ocean, which properties were not riparian to the lagoon or La Ballona Creek.
These actions for damages followed, and each complaint
alleges five causes of action. The first cause alleges that the
defendants were negligent in constructing and maintaining
an "artificial" drainage system of insufficient size in that
the lagoon outlet was inadequate to carry and discharge into
the ocean the concentrated and accelerated flow of water
which resulted from the high-speed impervious concrete storm
drains installed by defendants. The second cause alleges
that while the improvement of the drainage area was for a
public use and purpose no compensation was made to the
plaintiffs and their assignors for the damage thereby caused
to their property. The third cause alleges that the defendants disregarded plaintiffs' rights by constructing a drainage
system which caused more storm or surface water to be carried into La Ballona Lagoon than it could carry, and by
failing to remove such obstructions in. the lagoon as bridges
and an oil derrick. The fourth cause alleges that the defendants have by means of the concrete storm drains and
conduits" diverted" water from the streets within the drainage area to the plaintiffs' property in increasing quantities
and with destructive force. The fifth cause alleges that the
defendants have caused and permitted obstructions in and
across the lagoon outlet without taking the necessary precautions against the overflow of storm waters flowing therein.
. Prior to the consolidation of these two actions for trial,
a demurrer of the defendant flood control district to the
first, fourth and fifth causes of action was sustained without
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leave to amend in the Archer case. Upon appeal it was
stated, in part, by the District Court of Appeal that "The
gist of [the] ... complaint ... is that respondent constructed and built an artificial drainage system so defectively,
carelessly and negligently that it would not carry the storm
waters to the Pacific Ocean as designed and intended" and
"that the injury to the appellants occurred by reason of the
fact that respondent negligently turned the storm waters into
La Ballona lagoon, which was too small to conduct the water
turned into it by and through the drainage system constructed, operated and maintained by respondent. . . , "
The District Court of Appeal thereupon reversed the judgment entered upon the sustaining of the demurrer without
leave to amend, concluding that the complaint adequately
alleged causes of action in the respects mentioned. (Archer
v. City of Los Angeles, 15 Cal. App. (2d) 520 [59 Pac. (2d)
605].) This is of significance upon this appeal since the
motion for nonsuit made (and here granted) at the close of
the plaintiffs' case operates as a demurrer to the evidence.
(See cases cited in 9 Cal. Jur. 551, sec. 35.) If, as held by
the District Court of Appeal, the complaint in the Archer
case (identical with that in the Allison case) states causes
of action for damages based on the negligent or defective
construction of public works, and the evidence thereafter
adduced by the plaintiffs tends to establish the allegations
of the complaints, the trial court must be held to have erred
in nonsuiting the plaintiffs. I t is settled that "A nonsuit
should be granted only when, accepting the full force of the
evidence adduced, together with every reasonable inference
' favorable to the plaintiff, which may be drawn therefrom,
and excluding all evidence in conflict therewith, it still appears that the law precludes the plaintiff from recovering a
(Mastrangelo', v.
judgment under such circumstances."
West Side U. H. School Dist., 2 Cal. (2d) 540, 5'44 [42 Pac.
(2d) 634]; Angelus Sec. Corp. v. Ball, 20 Cal. App. (2d)
423, 436 [67 Pac. (2d) 152, 158].)
The witness Frisbie, a civil engineer, who had been familiar
with the La Ballona drainage area for approximately eighteen
years, described its natural state and subsequent develo'pmente He pointed out that engineers employ two principal
methods to control flood waters: to retard and hold them
back in storage reservoirs, or to confine the -waters,that
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natttrally flow over porous soils to line channels at high speed
so that more water will flow to the outlet at given times. He
added that the problem in the latter method, which he stated
'Was employed by the defendants to drain the La Ballona
watershed, is the outlet. He testified that the effect of the
concrete storm drains and the straightening and widening of
the La Ballona channel to concentrate the run-off, was not
only to accelerate the flow but to cause more water to flow
down because it was no longer in part lost in absorption
or evaporation. "To discharge that water through these
high-speed drains, concentrate, and discharge it right out
into open space, with no control over it, and then a thoroughly
bottled up outlet, in my opinion, would be very bad engineering. . . . The capacities of the outlets into, the lagoon
between the sand bar and the sand dunes, in the condition
in which they were during that period, were insufficient
to carry off the water, to carry the water away as fast as'
it was arriving." He gave a negative answer to the question
whether it was "good engineering to construct an elaborate
system of storm drains in the upper part of,theLaBallona
Creek watershed, and for the Los Angeles County' Flood
It Control District to construct a fine, high-speed.m8;ih~hahnel
, down to and beyond Centinela Boulevard,'and"then turn
the storm water loose at that point 'with 'suchi'faMlities "as
existed for its escape into La Ballona 'Lagoon,' 'aeF e:dst:ed ;;()n
December 31, 1933." As reasons therefor he,'a:aded(" Because the construction of all these ,high-speed ;dra:his
the great areas of impervious surfaces :greatlyiricreased :the
quantity of storm waters that would arrive doWn in that
'area at a given time, and would require good~ ariipl~-facilities
for an outlet capacity far greater than it required under
the natural conditions of that watershed,"when'a'greatdeal
of that water never got there, because it 'was 'a:bsorb'e'd>intne
'debris cones and absorbed in the brush' arid 'ailikind~!:!of
growth, and when it approached at, very 'slow ' veld~ities
through these cienagas and over the natural sU'rface2-to turn
that loose at that point with no open,'flaf'couhtry and''ilO
possible way to force that water through' a:: limited outlet
without piling the water up several feet deep, in rfty opInion,
was not good engineering."
The witness Bell, a consulting civil engineer, whd;'maiiy
years earlier had done some work for the defendant flood

and

;'l

19 C. (2d)-2

..

84

"

ARCHER V. CITY OF

Los

ANGELES.

[19 C. (2d)

Nov. 1941.]

ARCHER V. CITY OF
[19

control district and the defendant county in connection with
La Ballona Creek, described the area in its natural and subsequently altered state much as did the witness Frisbie. He,
too, testified that it was not "good engineering to construct
an elaborate system of storm drai:'J.s in the upper part of
La Ballona watershed, and for the I.1oS Angeles County Flood
Control District to construct a fine, high-speed main channel
down to and beyond Centinela bridge . . . and then turn
the storm waters loose at the point with such facilities as
existed for its escape into La Ballona Lagoon, as existed on
December 31, 1933 . . . because if there were no facilities for
the escape of that water when it got down to the estuary of
La Ballona, there was created what you might call practically
a cul de sac. It could not get out. It was bound to collect
like a reservoir and spread out all over the country; nothing
to prevent it."
A series of letters, placed in evidence by the plaintiffs as
exhibits, definitely indicate that the appropriate officers of
the three defendant entities had knowledge for several years
'prior to the flood here involved of the imperative necessity
for a change in the La Ballona outlet to the ocean. On J anuary 6, 1931, the chief engineer of the defendant flood control district addressed a letter to the board of supervisors
of the defendant county wherein he stated that in the
previous month he had received a letter from the Venice
Chamber of Commerce requesting the ' 'construction of a
dyke to protect Venice from flood waters." In his letter the
chief engineer pointed out to the board that "The natural
rate of flow of La Ballona Creek has been greatly increased
due to the discharge into it of six (16 in 1933) storm dra'tns
of which four are Los Angeles Oity, one Oulver City and
one County Drain. The Flood Control District has during
the past summer enlarged and cleaned the entire channel
where rights of way were obtained. Lacking an adequate
outlet to the ocean the channel capacity has each year been
barely sufficient to handle the relatively low flows that have
occurred and in the event of a major or even a moderate
flood two principal locations would be subject to damage.
1. The City of Venice. 2. Culver City and vicinity. . . . "
In an earlier letter (1930)' to the board of supervisors in
which the chief engineer discussed the drainage changes that
had been made in the area and of the then existence of five
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storm drains (county and city) and' of the,' prop()sal of i the
city to construct five additional drains,he'added "to; fully"
relieve the present situation an outlet 'to the 'ocean is ~esseritial. "
'
':~, ';
It is manifest that the foregoing facts: are '\stifficient'to
make a prima facie case in accordance'with plairitiffs" allegations and to establish what the District Coui-f'ot ,cAppeal
declared to be the gist of the Archer action~ that:Is/ that
"The gist of [the] . . . complaint . ~ . is that ;respondeJ?,t
constructed and built an artificial drainage system 'so defectively, carelessly and negligently that it would not 'carry
the storm waters to the Pacific Ocean as designed :and intended" and "that the injury occurred by reason of the fact
that respondent negligently turned the storni~aters into
La Ballona Lagoon, which was too small to conduct the water
turned into it by and through' the drainage system constructed, operated and maintained by respondent. . . . ",
(Archer v. City of Los Angeles, supra.) On the doctrine of
the law of the case, as to the Archer case, and stare' decisis,
as to the Allison case, it must be held that plaintiffs have
established the liability of defendants.
"'.
The attempted answer to that incontrovertible proposition
ai, advanced by the majority opinion is that: "According to the
allegations of the complaint, the damage resulted because
defendants negligently diverted water out of its natural
channel, and obstructed the channel of the creek. Plaintiffs
evidence, however, fails to substantiate such allegations."
That statement is palpably incorrect. The gist of the action
as stated by the District Court of Appeal was not that water
had been "diverted out of its natural. channel," rather it
was that the defendants negligently" turned the storm waters
into La Ballona Lagoon," that is, collected surface waters
and discharged them into the lagoon. The evidence without
contradiction shows that that occurred. The storm waters
were collected into drains and turned into the lagoon and
creek, the outlet of which was too small to carry' them, with
the result that plaintiffs' lands were flooded when the lagoon
overflowed. The prior decision is therefore the 'law of the
case and controlling here.
The true basis of liability in cases of this character is
found in the constitutional provision prohibiting the taking
or damaging of property for a publi~ use without the pay.,
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ment of just compensation. (California Constitution, art. I,
sec. 14.) The liability exists independent of negligence on
the part of the public agency. (Tormey v. Anderson-OottonU'ood Irr. Dist., 53 Cal. App. 559 [200 Pac. 814] ; Elliott v.
County of Los Angeles, 183 Cal. 472 [191 Pac. 899] ; Kaufman v. Tomich, 208 Cal. 19 [280 Pac. 130].) In the instant
case the evidence shows that the defendants launched and
constructed an extensive public improvement, to-wit: The
drainage of the area above-mentioned into the Pacific Ocean.
It establishes that the improvement was inherently improper,
was negligently planned and carried out, and was contrary
to skillful engineering practices. The drainage of the water
into the Pacific Ocean could not be accomplished without
flooding plaintiffs' land with the condition of the outlet from
La Ballona Lagoon being in the condition in which it existed.
Further, the evidence shows that defendants knew of that
condition. It cannot be said that the object and design of
the drainage system did not include the discharge of the
drainage water into the ocean. That discharge was necessarily an inseparable part of the entire drainage scheme.
Defendants were obligated therefore either properly to improve the outlet or to compensate anyone whose property was
damaged by reason of the insufficiency of the improvement.
They knew that the improvement would result in the flooding
of property; that flooding was a necessary and component
part of the entire system, and as they failed to acquire by
eminent domain the right to so flood the property, then they
must now compensate the owners thereof for the injury
thereby caused. In essence the situation is no different than
if defendants had constructed an outlet from the lagoon to
the ocean which was too small to carry the water and a flood
resulted. They adopted the natural outlet known to be
insufficient in size as a part and parcel of the improvement,
the drainage system. The case is not essentially different
from Kaufman v. Tomich, supra. There the improvemen1
consisted of a sewer line in a street. While the sewer ditch
was open, plaintiff's property, lying adjacent to the street,
was damaged by the shifting of the soil upon which rested
the foundation of hJr building. This court in affirming a
judgment for plaintiff stated at page 21:
" . . . that if the act commanded by the municipality was
inherently wrong, then both the municipality and the agent
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performing the work would be answerable in damages to anyone injured thereby, even in the absence of negligence in its
performance. This declaration finds support in Perkins v.
Bla'ldh, 163 Cal. 782, 789 (127 Pac. 50, 53), wherein the rule·
is expressed in the following language: ' Upon the other hand, .
if the act is one commanded by the municipality' itself, if·
inherently wrong, tho municipality and the agent who performed will both be liable. . . . If the injury· results, how- '
ever, not from the wrongful plan or character of the work,
but from the nogli~ent or improper manner in which it is
performed, the one so negligently acting will always be responsihle, and the public corporation mayor may not be
responsihle, depending- upon the relationship which it may
sustain to that agent.' Being satisfied that the trial court,
on competent evidence, has found the plan and location of the
sewer to bo inherently wrong and dangerous, Judge Strother
declared, as his opinion, that judgment was properly entered'
against both defendants." The trial court had found in the
Kaufman case that the "location and alignment 'or the said
sewer were intrinsically dangerous and inherently wrong, and
were of such a nature and of so close proximity to the front
'", of plaintiff's property and plaintiff's wall as were likely in
~. the natura,l course of construction of the said sewer-to damage and injure said . . . property. . . . " (Emphasis
a,dded.) In the cases at bar the evidence is capable of the
construction that the drainage system without a proper outlet
was not only likely but certain to cause the flooding of plaintiffs' land and the defendants knew that result would :follow..
Reference may be made to the language in Oonniff v. San
Francisco, 67 Cal. 45, 50 [7 Pac. 41], involving the flooding
of plaintiff's land by the construction of 'a street: which
dammed a stream:
;
..
"The case before us is not one of mere, consequential dam.;.;
age which the tand owner must protect himself against,; ~ri.d'
for which the law affords him no redress; Itisadirecf
trespass on the property of plaintiff by the' ;constrU'cti6n' 'of 1
a dam which a moment's reflection would have 'made' 'clear.:,
to anyone, must inevitably in the cours.e of nature hl1lVere.;.t
8ultedin the permanent overflowing the land'oi'Plaintift
when the rainy season came, and from which h~' icould'onIyt
free himself by cutting away a public highway, lfor' iwhlch
he might have been proceeded against both by 8.'civil and~
I
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criminal action." (Emphasis added.) In the instant case,
not only would a moment's reflection have made it clear to
anyone that plaintiffs' land would be flooded, but defendants
actually knew it. In Spangler v. San Francisco, 84 Cal. 12
[23 Pae. 1091, 18 Am. St. Rep. 158], the eonstruction of a
street along a stream interfered with the flow therein, and
defendant provided sewers or storm drains to carry the
waters thereof to Mission Bay; by reason of disrepair the
sewer failed to earry the water and plaintiffs' property was
flooded. This eourt said at page 17:
"It was the duty of the city, w:1en it does provide water.:.
ways, to provide s1.u;h as are sufficient to carry off the water
that might reasonably be expected to accumulate. The rule
is so laid down in Damour v. Lyons Oity, 44 Iowa, 282; approved and followed in Powers v. Oity of Oouncil Bluffs, 50
Iowa, 201,202. (See Mayor of New York v. Bailey, 2 Denio,
433. ) We think the rule above stated correct, and approve
it." (Emphasis added.) And at page 19:
"Dillon states that 'there is a municipal' liability where
the property of private persons is flooded, either direetly or
by water being sent back, when this is the result of the negligent execution of the plan adopted for the eonstruction of
gutters, drains, eulverts, or sewers, or of the negligent failure
to keep the same in repair and free from obstruetion, and
this, whether the lots are below the grade of the streets or
not. The cases support this proposition with great unanimity.' "
In Stanford v. San Francisco, III Cal. 198 [43 Pae. 605],
the eonstruction of a street (analogous to the drains in the
cases at bar) by a city caused the collection of surface water
which flowed into plaintiff's basement because of insufficient
drainage facilities. It was held that the city was liable, this
court stating at page 202:
, 'Here the grade of Jessie street was not changed, nor is
there any claim that the premises occupied by plaintiffs were
below grade. Here a street, which before it was paved
absorbed the water falling upon it, by the paving is made
to retain and eollect the same upon its surface, no means
being provided for removing or conducting it away. The
portion of the street so paved crossed no street or a,lley by
which it could be diverted, and as the easterly end was more
than two feet lower than its westerly end, and was absolutely
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closed at the lower end by a building which cross~d it, it was
inevitable that the water falling on that portion of the street
below Fourth street would be collected and retained until it
could escape by flowing over the curb and sidewalk and into
the basement occupied by the plaintiffs. . . . . ; . . .
'
"Counsel for appellant cites section 1039 of :.Dillon 'sMu,nicipal Corporations in support of the. proposit~dnithat··'the_
law regards surface water as a commoneneniy~',~wHicii every'
proprietor may fight or get rid of as best heinay~~' , " t : '<;,':.
"That section and the two following are devbted'to'the
subject of 'liability in respect of surface water,' a:nd thehist
of these (section 1041) is devoted to the question' of'the
'omission to provide drains.' The learned author says:' It
is clear that there is no liability on the part' 0'£ ,a municipal
corporation for not exercising the discretionary
legislative
powers it may possess to improve streets, and. as part, of such
improvement, to eonstruct gutters or provide 'other means'
for draining for surface waters, so as to prevent them from
flowing upon the adjoining lots.' But in note 2ib' s'aid seetion it is said: 'If the necessity for the drainage is oaUsed by
the city, the doctrine of the text (section 1041) that it is not
bound
~
. to supply the drainage does not apply.' . Even as ap, plIed to property below the level of the street the same learned
author says: 'It is possible there may be no middle ground;
but we are unable to assent to the doctrine that by' ~eason of
their control over streets, and the power to grade and improve
them, the corporate authorities have the absolute and unconditional legal right intentionally to divert the water therefrom, as a mode of protecting the streets, and to discharge
it by artificial means, in increased quantities and with eollective force and destructiveness, upon the property, perhaps
improved and occupied, of the adjoining owner.' (Dillon
on Municipal Corporations, sec. 1042.) In a note to this
section, in the fourth edition, he says: 'The many eases since
decided, cited in the notes, have found and defined the
, , middle ground,' , therein referred to, and adjudged the
law to be as stated in the text.'
"In Ashley v. Port Huron, 35 Mich. 296, 35 Am. Rep.
552, it was held that where a city construeted a sewer in
such manner as to throw a large quantity of water upon
plaintiff's premises which otherwise would not have flowed
there1 it was liable for the damage caused thereby. In the
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in that case, after referring to a great many 8Uithoriiies, .Chief Justice Cooley said: 'I t is very manifest·,
from this reference to authorities, that they recognize in
municipal corporations no exemption from responsibility
where the' injury an individual has received is a direct .injury accomplished by a corporate act which is in the nature
of a trespass upon him. The right of an individual to the
occupation and enjoyment of his premises is exclusive, and
the public authorities have no more liberty to trespass upon
it than has a private individual. If a corporation send
people with picks and spades to cut a street through it
without first acquiring the right of way, it is liable for a
tort; but it is no Ip.ore liable under such circumstances than
it is when it pours upon his land a flood of water by a public
sewer so constructed that the flooding must be a necessary
result. The one is no more unjustifiable than the other.
Each is a trespass,: and in each instance the city exceeds
its lawful jurisdiction. A municipal charter never gives and
never could give authority to appropriate the freehold of a .
chizen without compensation, whether it be done through
an actual taking of its streets or buildings, or by flooding it,
so as to interfere with the owner's possession. His property right is as much appropriated in the one case as in the
other.'
"In Seifert v. Brooklyn, 101 N. Y. 136, 142, 54 Am. Rep.
664, it was said: 'Municipal corporations have quite invariably been held liable for damages occasioned by acts
resulting in the creation of public or private nuisances, or
for an. unlawful entry upon the premises of another whereby
injury to his property has been occasioned. (Baltimore etc.
R. R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U. S. 317 [2 Sup.
Ct. 719, 27 L. Ed. 739].) This principle has been uniformly
applied to the act of such corporation in constructing streets,
. sewers, drains and gutters, whereby the surface wat~r of a
large territory, which did not naturally flow in that direction,
was gathered into a body, and thus precipitated upon the
premises of an individual, occasioning damage thereto. ' (See
also note to Chalkley v. Richmond, 29 Am. St. Rep. 742, under
the head' Surface Water,' where a large number of cases
from many ditferent states are cited.)
"In Los Angeles Cemetery Assn. v. Los Angeles, 103 Cal.
461,.,470 [37 Pac. 375], the same principle is asserted; and
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in the later case of De Baker v. Southern Cal. Ry. Co., 106
Cal. 257, 282 [39 Pac. 610] 46 Am. St. Rep. 237, it was said:
'But if the work was inherently and according to its plan
and location a dangerous obstruction to the river, such as
ordinary prudence should have guarded against, not only the
author of the plan to obstruct the stream (the city of I.1oS
.Angeles), but the person placing the obstruction, was severally liable for the entire damage.' (See, also, Reardon v.
San Francisco, 66 Cal. 492 [6 Pac. 317], 5:6 Am. Rep. 109,
where the city was held liable for an injury to plaintiff's
lot caused by work done upon the street, which was the immediate, direct and necessary effect of the work done.)
u Oorcoran v. Benicia, 96 Cal. 1 [30 Pac. 798], 31 Am. St.
Rep. 171, and the other cases cited by appellant on page 5
of his brief do not conflict with the authorities which we have
cited above. Oorcoran v. Benicia, supra, is to the effect that
a municipal corporation is not liable for damages caused by
the prevention of the flow of surface water from the lot of
a private owner, by raising the street to the grade, where
such water does not run in a natural channel across the
lot. The distinction between that case and this is obvious,
and the other cases cited by appellant rest upon similar
facts. ' , ( Emphasis added.)
There is no distinction between failure to provide a proper
sewer to carry off the surface waters collected by the municipality, and a failure to provide a proper outlet from
La Ballona Lagoon. Also there is no distinction between
the paving of a street which thereby collected surface water
and discharged it on plaintiff 's land and accomplishing the
same result by concrete drains.
It is said in 43 Corpus Juris 1126, in regard to establishment of drainage systems by municipalities:
"But according to a number of authorities this rule does
not extend to exempt a municipality from liability for negligence in the adoption of a pIan for drains or sewers, and
where the municipal authorities negligently adopt or devise
a plan or system which is obviously defective, or the unfitness of which has been demonstrated by previous experience,
the municipality is liable for the reSUlting damage. It has
also been laid down that the rule under discussion is subject
to the distinction that, where the plan adopted by a mu-
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nicipality must necessarily cause an injury to private property, equivalent to some appropriation of the enjoyment
thereof to which the owner is entitled, then the municipality
is liable, but where the fault found is with the wisdom of
the measure or its sufficiency or adaptability to carry out or
accomplish the purpose intended, and where its construction
according to the plan adopted invades no private rights, then
the municipality is not liable."
Pacific Seaside Home v. N ewbert P. Dist., 190 Cal. 544
[213 Pac. 967]', is a case precisely in point and squarely
contrary to the holding of the majority opinion. This court
said in that case at page 546:
"The gIst of the plaintiff's complaint is that the defendant
constructed channels for the water of the Santa Ana River
so defectively and negligently that they would not carry the
waters of the. stream. Plaintiff alleges that 'had the defendant not changed the natural course of the Santa Ana River,
or in anywise interfered with its natural flow, the waters of
the Santa Ana River :would have flowed on into Newport Bay
and no damage would have accrued to the plaintiff had the
said river been permitted to flow as it naturally would had ~
not tHe defendant constructed its channel to divert the same.
... ' It is further alleged in effect that the injury occurred
to the plaintiff by reason of the fact that the defendant
negligently turned the waters of the Santa Ana River in a
. channel which was too small, and which was negligently constructed and maintained, and that by reason thereof it was
damaged.
"These facts sufficiently state a cause of action. " (Emphasis added.)
In the cases at bar defendants constructed drains, altered
the channel and interfered with the natural drainage and
discharged the waters into the lagoon, the outlet of which
"was too small," all to the damage of plaintiffs.
Commencing with the premise that the state or an agency
thereof would not be liable for the flooding of plaintiffs'
lands, if an individual would not be responsible for the same
conduct, the majority opinion concludes that defendants are
not liable because: "It is established in California and other
jurisdictions that a lower owner has no right of redress for
InJury to his land caused by improvements made in the
stream for the purpose of draining or protecting the land
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above, even though the channel is inadequate to accommodate the increased flow of water resulting from the improvements. " (Obviously the statement is directly contrary to
Pacific Seaside Home v. Newbert P. Dist., supra.) In connection therewith it is also stated: "Likewise there is no diversion
if surface waters, flowing in no defined channel, are for a
reasonable purpose gathered together and discharged into
the stream that is their natural means of drainage even
though the stream channel is inadequate to accommodate
the increased flow. A California landowner may not collect
such waters and discharge them upon adjacent land . . . but
he may discharge them for a reasonable purpose into the
stream into which they naturally drain without incurring
liability for damage to lower land caused by the increased
flow of the stream." (Emphasis added.) Those propositions are entirely out of line with the long and firmly
established law in California with respect to surface waters.
An upper owner may not collect surface waters in channels
and thereby cause them to flow upon a lower owner's land
in increased volume to his damage. This rule has been commonly referred to as the civil law rule as distinguished from
the common law rule. The rule in this state was stated
many years ago in Oonniff v. San li'rancisco, supra, at page
49:
"An individual has no right to collect in artificial channels mere surface water, and precipitate it upon the land of
another. Nor has a corporation, whether public or private,
the right to collect in such channels mere surface water precipitated by rain or snow over large districts, and throw it
upon the property of another. The cases to this effect are
numerous, and may be found cited in a note to section 272
of Gould on Waters." (See, also, Los Angeles O. Assn. v.
Los Angeles, 103 Cal. 461 [37 Pac. 375]; Stanford v. San
Francisco, supraj Rudel v. Los Angeles Oounty, 118 Cal.
281 [50 Pac. 400] ; Larrabee v. Oloverdale, 131 Cal. 96 [63
Pac. 143] ; Wood v. Moulton, 146 Cal. 317 [80 Pac. 92] ; Galbreath v. Hopkins, 159 Cal. 297, 298 [113 Pac. 174] ; Shaw v.
Sebastopol, 159 Cal. 623 [115 Pac. 213] ; Heier v. Krull) 160
Cal. 44] [117 Pac. 530] ; Thomson v. La Petra, 180 Cal. 771
[183 Pac. 152] ; Le Brun v. Richards, 210 Cal. 308 [291 Pac.
825, 72 A. L. R. 336] ; Switzer v. Yunt, 5 Cal. App. (2d) 71
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[41 Pac~ (2d) 974]; Everett v. Davis, 18 Cal. (2d) 389
[115 Pac. (2d) 821].)
Even though the surface waters collected are discharged in
a natural channel on the upper owner's land, he is liable for
flooding the land of the lower owner where the cause of the
flooding is the increase in the volume of the water flowing to
the lower owner beyond the capacity of the stream.
The true rule with respect to the drainage of surface
waters and rights in relation thereto is set forth in Le Brun v.
Richards, supra, Although the factual situation there was
not the same as here the rule there announced is applicable
to a factual situation such as that here involved. It was
t.here stated:
'" . . . From these rights and burdens, the principle
follows that he has a lawful right to complain, of others,
who, by interfering with natural conditions, cause such surface water'to be discharged in greater quantity or in a different manner' upon his land than would occur under natural
conditions. This is the settled law of this state.' In support
of the above statement the court cites a long array of earlier
decisions. On the other hand, a different rule applies in
the case of flood waters. Such waters are regarded as 'a
common enemy against which every man has a right to defend
himself, regardless of the fact that the barriers he erects for
the protection of his land may cause the flood to rise higher
or flow with greater force upon his neighbors.' (McDaniel
v. Cummings, 83 Cal. 515 [8 L. R. A. 575, 23 Pac. 795, 797].)
This rule has been enunciated and applied in a number of
cases, among which may be mentioned Lamb v. Reclamation
Dist., 73 Cal. 125 [2 Am. St. Rep. 775, 14 Pac. 625], Sangui:netti v. Pock, 136 Cal. 466 [89 Am. St. Rep. 169, 69 Pac. 98,
.99], Gray:v. Reclamation Dist., 174 Cal. 622 [163 Pac. 1024],
!ap.d Hortorvv:- Goodenough, 184 Cal. 455 [194 Pac. 34, 35])'
:And again: at page 315 :
g;\ ;" The(upper' proprietor may not divert by· artificial means
,the surface-waters upon his own lands to the lands of the
.lower proprietor nor may he accelerate by means of ditches
or increase the drainage of his own land to the injury of the
flower owner. 'His right 'is limited to the disposition of the
'water through the chosen channels of nature.' (Board of
rTrustees' v.Rodley, supra.)" (Emphasis added.)
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By the weight of authority the right of an upper owner
to drain surface water into a watercourse is qualified to the
extent that the flow must not be increased beyond the capacity
of the stream; the flow of a stream cannot be increased beyond its natural capacity as was done here to the injury of
one's property below by flooding. (Thompson on Real Property, Perm. Ed., vol. 2, sec. 663; Ryder v. Town of Lexington,
303 Mass. 281 [21 N. E. (2d) 382]; North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U. S. 365 [44 Sup. Ct. 138, 68 L. Ed. 342] ; Jackman
v. Arlington Mills, 137 Mass. 277; Belcastro v. Norris, 261
Mass. 174 [158 N. E. 535] ; Smith v. Orben, 119 N. J. Eq.
291 [182 Atl. 153] ; McCormick v. Horan, 81 N. Y. 86 [37
Am. Rep. 479] ; Spink v. Corning, 61 App. Div. 84 [70 N. Y.
Supp. 143] ; note, 28 A. L. R. 1262). And that rule is applicable where the one doing the draining is a public corporation. (Sisters of St. Joseph Corp. v. Atlas Gravel & Stone
Go., 120 Conn. 168 [180 Atl. 303] ; Baldwin v. Ohio Twp.,
70 Kan. 102 [78 Pac. 424, 109 Am. St. Rep. 414, 67 L. R, A.
642]; Hicks v. Owensboro, 6 Ky. L. Rep. 226; Noonan v.
Albany, 79 N. Y. 470 [35 Am. Rep. 540]; McCutchen v.
Peekskill, 167 Misc. 460 [3 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 277] ; Ryder v.
Town of Lexington, supraj Miller v. City of Woodburn, 134
Ore. 536 [294 Pac. 349]; McQuillin Mun. Corps., vol. 6,
secs. 2874, 2878, 2881, 2882, 2885.)
The obvious result of the conclusion reached in the majority opinion is that an upper owner may, with absolute
impunity, gather surface waters on his land in any quantity,
discharge them into a stream, and thereby flood the land of
a lower owner even though that lower owner's land is not
riparian to the stream, is three miles away from the stream,
and has never been burdened with surface waters in connection with the stream involved or from the drainage area
involved. The authorities relied upon by the majority'opinion
for that shocking proposition are not in point when applied to a factual situation disclosed by the record in these
cases. They consist, with a single exception, of cases from
other jurisdictions. A review of several of them reveals
their character. The case of Board of Drain. Com'rs. etc.
v. Board of Drain. Com'rs., 130 Miss. 764 [95 So. 75, 28
A. L. R. 1250], predicated its holding on the premise that
an upper riparian owner by virtue of his ownership, may
collect the surface watE:rs and discharge them into a stream
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even though a lower riparian owner is injured. That case
conceded that the weight of authority was to the contrary.
Furthermore, the conduct involved was not the act of any
one upper owner which caused the flooding; that result
followed only because of a similar practice by many owners.
(See DrainageDist.v. Haverstick, 186 Ark. 374 [53 S. W.
(2d). 589, 590, 591].) That is not the case here. In City
of Ham~1ton v. Ashbrook, 62 Ohio St. 511 [57 N. E. 239],
the .flooqing was, caused· by the breaking of a levee and not
'
by. ex~ess.,d~ainage into the stream.
. In Peck y .. Herrington, 109 Ill. 611 [50 Am. Rep. 627])
the rigb,t/ 'was limited to the flow of surface waters into
natural channels. ' In that case the court said: "The natural
flow of the surface water was not changed. . . . " (Emphasis added.) In the cases at bar surface water is collected in
artificial channels and the flow increased.
The language in Robb v. Village of La Grange, 158 Ill. 21
[42 N. E. 77], is dictum.
In O'Donnell v. City of Syracuse, 184 N. Y. 1 [76 N. E. 738,
112 Am. St. Rep. 558, 6 Ann. Cas. 173, 3 L. R. A. (N. S ..}
1053], the flooding was caused by an act of God and not tlTh
discharge of drainage waters. The court stated at page 743:
"The plaintiff and the other citizens affected by the flood
were no worse off than they would have been if the creek had
not been used at all for sewerage purposes, except for the
incidental deposit of sewage matter." (Emphasis added.)
Plaintiffs in the cases at bar are undeniably worse off because of the drainage system.
Dudley v. Village of Buffalo, 73 Minn. 347, 76 N. W. 44,
is clearly not in point. There the court stated at page 45:
"It is clear, then, that the village is not liable for putting
in the upper drain, and thereby carrying the water across
the street, because it did not gather the surface water, and
unnecessarily discharge it in a stream upon the plaintiff's
premises, where it did not naturally belong." (Emphasis
added.)
Waffle v. New York Central R. R. Co., 53 N. Y. 11 [13 Am.
Rep. 467], is distinguished in a later New York c~se which
recognizes and applies the rule that an upper riparian owner
may not collect surface waters and discharge them into a
stream in excess of its capacity. In Noonan v. City of Albany, 79 N. Y. 470 [35 Am. Rep. 540], the court in limiting
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the rule. of the Waffle case stated at page 477: "The right
of a riparian owner to drain the surface-water on his lands
into a stream which flows through them, and which is its
natural outlet, is an incident to his right as riparian owner
to the reasonable use of the stream. But this right is not,
we conceive, an 8,bsolute right under all circumstances, irrespective of the size of ihe stream, or the natural purpose
which it sub serves, to throw into it surface-water by means
of ditches or drains, when by so doing it will be filled beyond
its natural capacity, and overflow and flood the lands of a
lower proprietor. " (Emphasis added.) This is directly in
accord with the views herein expressed by me.
City of Maysville v. Brooks, 145 Ky. 526 [140 S. W. 665],
does not involve a factual situation in any way analogous
to the cases at bar.
In Strauss v. Allentown, 215 Pa. 96 [63 Atl. 1073, 7 Ann.
Cas. 686], the court applied the" common enemy" rule to
surface waters. It cannot be doubted that such rule is applicable only to flood waters in California, and may not be
applied to surface waters. (26 Cal. Jur. 279-293.) The
same is true of Jefferson County Drainage Dist. v. McFaddin,
(Tex. Civ. App.) 291 S. W. 322. City of Ludlow v. Broderick, 181 Ky. 123 [203 S. W. 1082], recognized the limitation on the right to collect and discharge surface waters.
The court said at page 1083:
"Finally it is insisted that the smooth surface of the brick
street has facilitated the flow of the water and allowed it to
pass freer and faster but in the same course and quantity.
The rule recognized in this state does not allow a recovery
by a lower or servient estate for damages where the quantity
of water is not increased nor caused to flow in a new or
different course or channel. So long as the volume of the
'Water remains the same and is confined to its usual and ordinary course there is not actionable wrong in facilitating its
, flow by cleaning the channel or leveling the surface so as to
let it pass without obstruction or run rapidly." (Emphasis
added.)
The same is true of Manteufel v. Wetzel, 133 Wis. 619, 114
N. W. 91, the court stating at page 92:
"In other words, causing surface water to flow in its
natural direction through a ditch on one's own land instead
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of over the surface or by percolation as formerly, where no
new watershed is tapped by said ditch and no addition to the
former volume of surface water is caused thereby, except the
mere ,carrying in a ditch what formerly reached the same
point on' defendant's land over a wider surface by percolation through the soil or by flowing over such wider surface,
is not, when not negligently done, a wrongful or unlawful
act. " (Emphasis added.)
A similar comment applies to Trigg v. Trimmerman, 90
Wash. 678 [156 Pac. 846, L. R. A. 1916F, 424].
A further review of the authorities from other jurisdictions relied upon by the majority opinion would serve no
useful purpose. Most of them do not stand for the rule for
which they are cited; many are, on the contrary, in accor,dance with the views herein expressed. In any event as
has heretofore been seen those apparently in point are out
of line with the weight of authority.
The only case in California cited in the majority opinion
for the 'foregoing propositions is San Gabriel Valley Oountry
Olubv.Oounty of Los Angeles, 182 Cal. 392 [188 Pac. 554, '
9 A. L. ~. 1200]. Not only are the facts of that case inac- -'
curately stated in the majority opinion, but the purported
holding therein relied upon is dictum and was in no way
necessary to the decision of that case. In that case the county
of Los Angeles placed concrete conduits in a natural water,course. The watercourse flowed through plaintiff's land
which' 'was" riparian thereto and was situated about a mile
below' the: point where'the conduit ended. The conduit accelerated 'the flow of the stream causing erosion where the
stream flowed; through plaintiff's land. There was not any
'construction ~ofi'''concrete storm drains" as stated in the
majority" op'inion; the conduit was placed in and as' a part
ofa natural 'watercourse. There was no collecting of surface
u~aters by; the construction of drains and the discharge therefrom of 'water into a natural watercourse, as exists in the
cases at~ 'bar. There was no evidence of any flooding of
plaintiff?s land or that the conduit caused water to flow in
the stre~m in excess of its capacity. This court there saId at
page 404 : HIt does not appear from the findings in the present case whether the plaintiff's land was flooded or not."
(EmphaSIS added.) It is quite apparent therefore that the
San Gabriel case is not similar to the cases at bar on its
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facts, and anything stated therein with respect to gathering
surface waters and discharging them into a stream followed
by a flooding of a lower owner's land because the capacity
of the stream was overtaxed, is nothing but dictum and not
here controlling. Furthermore, the views so expressed are
in conflict with the law in this state with respect to surface
waters, and are in effect discarded by Le Brun v. Richards,
s'upra, which at a later date expressed the true California
rule on the subject.
In addition to the foregoing discussion there are many
other respects in which the San Gabriel case is not properly
an authority for the rules enunciated in the majority opinion.
First, it is said in that case, at page 396:
"But the whole effect of the drains, so far as increasing
the volume in the stream is concerned, may be summed up
by saying that they add no water to that already in the
channel and that which would coine to it on the way, but
merely serve to pass such waters more completely and more
speedily from one point in the channel to another, all entirely
above the plaintiff's land." (Emphasis added.)
In the cases at bar the drains do add water to that already
in the channel by collecting and discharging the surface water
therein. Second, the court states in the cited case, at page'
396:
'
"The plaintiff's land is a mile or more below the lower
end of the drains, and any impetus the water may have as
it emerges from the drains must be lost long before reaching
the plaintiff's land. There is no increase in velocity, in other
words, except such as is a necessary incident of an increased
volume. ' , ( Emphasis added.)
In other words any increased velocity of the flow was lost
before the stream reached plaintiffs' land. Third, it is stated
therein that it does not appear "that it (the conduit in the
watercourse) was cOL,structed in a manner more burdensome
to the plaintiff than was required for the purpose for which
it was constructed." In the instant cases the evidence is
clear that the flooding of plaintiffs' land could have been
avoided if the outlet to the ocean had been given proper attention. Fourth, the waters involved in the Soo Gabriel case
were not surface waters; here the waters collected by the
drains which run into the La Ballona Creek conduit are
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surface waters which are collected by artificial means, the
drains, and discharged into La BallonaCreek. The increase
of ,water so brought about contributed to the flooding. It is
saId in the San Gabriel case, at page 398:
"It should also be observed at the outset that the present
case is not concerned with surface waters. Such waters in
the legal sense are those which fall on the land by precipitation from the skies or arise in springs and spread
over the surface of the ground without being collected into
a definite, body. (McDaniel v. Oummings, 83 Cal 515 [8
L. R. A.' 575, 23 Pac. 795] ; 3 Farnham on Waters, sec. 278.)
As to such waters the rule has been established by numerous
decisions in this state that a land owner may not gather them
together on his land by artificial means and discharge them
on to lower lying land in greater volume or in a different
manner than they would naturally be discharged. Of this
character are the following decisions cited on behalf of the
plaintiff: Conniff v. San Francisco, 67 Cal. 45 [7 Pac. 41] ;
Stanford v. San Francisco, 111 Cal. 198 [43 Pac. 605] ; Cushing v. Pires, 124 Cal. 663 [57 Pac. 572] ; Galbreath v. Hopkins, 159 Cal. 297 [113 Pac. 174] ; Shaw v. Sebastopol, 1:59
Cal. 623 [115 Pac. 213] ; Heier v. Krull, 160 Cal. 441 [117
Pac. 530]; Cox v. Odell, 1 Cal. App. 682 [82 Pac. 108f:1;
Peck v. Peterson, 15 Cal. App. 543 [115 Pac. 327]; and
Stanford University v. Rodley, 38 Cal. App. 563 [177 Pac.
175]. But the present case is not concerned with s~~rface
waters and the foregoing decisions are not in point. The
waters upon which the drains here in question act have lost
their character as surface waters before they reach the drains
and have already been gathered into a deji,nite body flowing
as a stream in a watercourse. The difference between surface
waters and those collected and flowing in a watercourse is
well recognized, and the same rules by no means apply to
one as to the other."
(Emphasis added.) Fifth, in the cases
at bar the water which caused the damage was collected and
discharged into La Ballona Lagoon and was thereby caused
to be discharged or spread over land it had never before
covered. Plaintiffs' land is three miles from the lagoon. This
distinction appears from the statement at page 398:
, 'Likewise, the distinction should be observed at the on tset between the present case and such decisions as Rude7 v.
Los Angeles County, 118 Cal. 281 [50 Pac. 400] ; Larrabee v.
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Cloverdale, 131 Cal. 96 [63 Pac. 143] ; Wood v. Moulton, 146
Cal. 317 [80 Pac. 92], and Humphreys v. Moulton, 1 Cal.
App. 257 [81 Pac. 1085], which are also cited on behalf of
the plaintiff. These cases were all concerned with water in
watercourses and with improvements or changes in drainage.
So far they resemble the case at bar. But in all of them,
unlike the present case, the improvement or change did not
have the effect merely of passing down the water in a stream
more completely and speedily from one point in its channel
to another, but of diverting it entirely from its channel and
discharging it either into a different channel in which it did
not naturally flow or upon neighboring land where there was
no channel." (Emphasis added.) Sixth, the plaintiffs' land
here is not riparian to La Ballona Creek; it is three miles
away and that creek never crossed it. In 'the San Gabriel
case the stream whose bed was improved crossed plainti.ff's
land. For that reason he must assume the burdens as well
as the benefits of riparian ownership, one of which is that
certain repairs and improvements may be made in the bed of
the stream above his land although the result is to his injury.
In the instant cases the stream never invaded plaintiffs' land
which is three miles therefrom, and to them the flooding of
the waters onto their land is the same as a diversion of the
stream onto their property which is admittedly an unlawful
trespass. Even if it were conceded that an upper owner may
with impunity, collect and discharge surface waters into a
natural watercourse with the result that lower land riparian
to that stream is flooded, defendants here would still be liable.
Under such a concession the reason for no liability would be
that by reason of the riparian character of the lower owner's
land, his riparian right and land might be said to be s'Llbject
to a servitude or easement owned by the upper owner, that
is, the right of the upper owner to use the stream as a drainage channel. But in the cases at bar plaintiffs' land is three
miles from the stream and is not subject to any such servitude. Furthermore, defendants have no property rights to
which such an easement could be appurtenant. (More is said
on that subject later herein.) Seventh, the court repeatedly
points out in the San Gabriel case that there is no claim of
the insufficiency or impropriety of the drainage system of
defendant, but in the instant cases it is clear that the system
was obviously improperly constructed and insufficient be-
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cause no proper outlet was furnished for the discharged
drainage water. Eighth, this court has recently held (July
31, 1941) that although it may be that an upper owner may
collect surface waters and discharge them into a stream flowing through his land (citing the San Gabriel case as authority) he may not in so doing change the nattlral conditions or
alter the /low in the stream to the damage of the lower owner.
In Everett v. Davis, supra, at page 61, this court said:
"The appellants also seek to justify their actions upon the
ground that the highway ditch was the natural means of
d1'ainage;,;tha:t all of the water from Estes Wash flowsinto it
at one point or another, and therefore they were entitled to
pOn<:,entrate these waters by a channel and bring them to the
ditch at one point. Of course, one may gather and discharge
surface waters into a stream which is their natural means
of: drainage. (San Gabriel V. C. v. Los Angeles, supra.)
But before the acts complained of in the present case, the
water naturally dispersed' over the land, and that part of it
which reached the ditch had ,lost much of its force. After
the appellants constructed their fences, the waters were sent
through a, narrow channel in a manner quite different from
the natural /low. Theretofore only some of these waters had
flowed into the ditch at different points over a wide area;
thechanne~ contrived, by the appellants brouuht practically
alt of the /lo.~ of Estes, Wash to one point with destructive
xorce., ,Unde,r these ,circumstances the principle relied upon
by the appellants has no application." (Emphasis added.)
,'l'h~.;majQrity;,opiI!.ion is squarely contrary to the Everett
,case~ (: In -ithecasesat bar the waters were gathered in ex,cessj:v,e, quantities ~in" the La BaUona Lagoon contrary to
natural.·,conditions, ,and the inevitable flooding occurred.
,H:As ,heretofore .stated the majority opinion launches its
discussion of the San Gabriel case on the premise that if a
private owner would not be liable for the conduct with which
the :defendantsare here charged, the public agencies, defendants in; this case, would not be liable, and in the fore'going discussion I have accepted that premise, but it will
not withstand a careful analysis. In fact, even a casual
scrutiny reveals its fallacy. Defendants here may well be
liable even though a private upper landowner might not be.
That rule may be proper as a general proposition, if its
application is limited. It is not applicable however, unless
7
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the state is in the same position as a private individual who
is not liable although inflicting damage because such damage
occurs in the proper exercise by him of some property right
possessed by him. If he is not liable it is because what he
has done has been in the lawful enjoyment of a property
right. (See Stewart v. Birchfield, 15 Cal. App. 378 [114
Pac. 999].) For illustration, if an upper riparian owner
uses the portion of the water to which he is lawfully entitled,
the lower owner may well be injured thereby because of an
insufficiency of water to satisfy all of the needs of both of
them. The lower owner though damaged, could not recover
from the upper owner because the latter in making a reasonable use of the water was exercising a legal property
right. That is the basis for the' rule that there may be i:njurf
but not liability. As a general rule a person is not liable
to another for an injury inflicted upon the latter if such'
injury occurs by reason of the lawful exercise by the former
of his property right. In the illustration above-mentioned
it would not be questioned that if someone who had no' rights
in the stream diverted the same quantity of water, the lower
owner could hold him liable. The state or public agency
is in no different category.' When it has no property right
to be exercised, it cannot escape liability for damaging a
person's property, although such damage might not be
actionable if caused by a private individual while lawfully
exercising a property right. Lacking a property right, there
are only two bases for a damaging of property by the state,
namely, the power of eminent domain, where compensation
must be paid, and the police power.
Defendants urge that the construction of the improvements
here involved was a proper exercise of the police power and
for that reason plaintiffs may not be compensated for the
damages suffered by them. The majority opinion discusses
the police power, but then for some unrevealed reason does
not reach any conclusion with respect to its application to
the cases at bar. It does not hold that the plaintiffs are
barred from recovery because the flooding was done under
the police power. It does state: "In certain circumstances,
however, the taking or damaging of private property for such
a purpose is not prompted by so great a necessity as to be
justified without proper compensation to the owner...
The liability of the state under article I, section 14 of the
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California Constitution arises when the taking or damaging
of' private property is not so essential to the general welfare
as to be sanctioned under" the police power." (Emphasis
added.) Manifestly, the correct test of whether or not the
police power has been properly exercised is not and never
has been the degree of public necessity. To be appropriate
it must be for the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare. If the degree of public necessity be the test then
the constitutional guarantee of just compensation for property taken for a public use is completely and forever abrogated. If a legislative body finds that public necessity
requires the taking of property for highways, for streets,
for a water supply, for recreational areas, for hospitals, for
schools or other public buildings, or for a myriad of other
public purposes, the courts must accept such a finding as conclusive. If such a finding is all that is necessary to warrant
the exercise of the police power, there will be no occasion
for the state or other public agency ever paying for any private property taken or damages for a public improvement.
Who may say that property for schools, highways, streets,
etc., is not absolutely necessary for the proper functioning of ~,
the government Y Indeed, it is an indispensable factor in
the exercise of the power of eminent domain where compensation is payable, that the public convenience and necessity
demand the taking or damaging of any private property involved in the public improvement contemplated. Thus, under
the theory advanced in the majority opinion, in any case that
the power of eminent domain may be properly exercised, the
police powe:r could also be invoked with the result that no
compensation could be recovered. Although it is difficult to
charter the dividing line between the exercise of the two
powers, it may. be justifiably said that police power operates
in the field of regulation, except possibly in some cases of
public emergency such as a, fire where buildings may be
destroyed, rather than in the taking or damaging of property for some public improvement. A man may be prevented
under the police power from so using 'or maintaining his
property that it is detrimental to the public health, safety~
lJ:!.orals or general welfare. Regulations may be invoked to
prohibit such use and maintenance. But where neither his
property nor its use or maintenance by him has any relation
to the public good sought to be accomplished or evil to be
;.'i
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remedied, other than that the public desires to use his property, he should be compensated for the taking or damaging
of it if the constitutional guarantee still exists. In the cases
at bar plaintiffs' use and maintenance of their property have
no relation to defendants' improvements. The distinction
between the two powers is discussed, in Lewis, Eminent Domain, 3rd ed., vol. 1, sec. 6, p. 13, as follows:
"Everyone is bound so to use his own property as not
to interfere with the reasonable use and enjoyment by others
of their property. For a violation of this duty the law provides a civil remedy. Besides this obligation, which every
property owner is under to the owners of neighboring property, he is also bound so to use and enjoy his own as not to
interfere with the general welfare of the community in which
he lives. It is the enforcement of this last duty which pertains to the police power of the State so far as the exercise
of that power affects private property. Whatever restraints
the legislature imposes upon the use and enjoyment of property within the reason and principle of this duty, the owner
must submit to, and for any inconvenience or loss which he
sustains thereby, he is without remedy. It is a regulation,
and not a taking, an exercise of police power, and not of
eminent domain. But the moment the legislature passes
beyond mere regulation, and attempts to deprive the individual of his property, or of some substantial interest therein,
under pretense of regulation, then the act becomes one of
eminent domain, and is subject to' the obligations and limitations which attend an exercise of that power. We shall
defer until a subsequent chapter a discussion of the limits
of the police regulation of private property and of the acts
which, though under the guise of police regulation, amount to
a taking of property for public use, and which, therefore, can
only be accomplished under the"power of eminent domain. It
is sufficient for the present purpose to point out the distinction
between the two powers. Under the one, the public welfare
is prompted by regUlating and restricting the use and enjoyment of property by the owner; under the other, the public welfare is promoted by taking the property from the
owner and appropriating it to some particular public use."
(Emphasis added.)
The majority opinion cites the case of Gray v. ReclamatiolI
District No. 1500, 174 Cal. 622 [163 Pac. 1024), in support
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.of the proposition that the state or its subdivisions may take
or.damage ,private property without compensation if such
:action is es~ential to safeguard public health, safety or morals.
,While it,is;.,t:rue that the Gray case holds that the drainage
.a~d "reclam~tion of lands, apart from any question of the
nayig~bility: of streams, is a legitimate exercise of the police
power of the state, itis in no respect an authority for holdh;lg that . the ,damages suffered by plaintiffs in the cases at
,bar, ,call.': b,e,.justified .under the most liberal exercise of the
'~olicepo'\Ver:t~~t .. ha.sever been asserted by enthusiastic
.adio~ates. of the .extension of that power. While there is
much ,dictum in the Gray case which has been seized upon
byt~os~.des~rin~to extend the application of the police power
.doctrine into the field of eminent domain, I think it is clear
that'.whell the Gray case is studied and analyzed, it cannot
,b~said., tp.~C'~heprill:ci:ples of law therein announced in any
waytrenchupon:or purport to abrogate the provisions of sec:,tlon::i(o~\ariicleI of our state Constitution prohibiting the
,taking .9:r. da~agiIlg -of private property for public use without
the paYI:llel1t'of just compensation therefor. In the first place,
the plaintiff. in the Gray case sought to restrain the reclama'tion district, .which was created by a statute passed by the
legislature ,of this state, from carrying into effect the provisions of such statute which were designed to control the
flood waters of the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers to
the. end that, the navigability of those rivers would be improved, and lands which were in danger of being flooded
during the period of run-off each year would be protected
from injury as the result of such floods, and thousands of
acres of land within the drainage area of said rivers would
be reclaimed from a state of inundation and brought into
,a state of productive use. The injury complained of by
plaintiff in the Gray case was prospective and temporary
only and this court expressly stated that plaintiffs could
protect themselves against it. At page 639 of the opinion
in said case the court states:
"In the case at bar it is to be observed that the flooding,
occasioned only by reason of the diminution of the area of
the Sutter Basin, will in the first place be but temporary and
will end when the reclamation works in the Sutter Basin are
completed, and, in the second place, may be protected against
by the levee district, in which most of plaintiff's lands are
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situated, and by the other property owners by a back levee,
or by the construction of the eastern levee of the Sutter
Basin by-pass, for their proportionate expense in building
which their lands would be liabltl under assessment by the
Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage District; while, upon
the other hand, the builders would be entitled to compensation from that district for any excess expenditure over their
due proportion which they might incur in the construction
of the work." (Emphasis added.)
In discussing the application of section 14 of article I of
our Constitution to the factual situation in the Gray case,
this court stated at pages 645 and 646 as follows:
'" ... It is insisted, however, that a distinction should
be made because of the provision of our constitution that
"private property shall not be taken, appropriated or damaged for public use without just compensation therefor"
(Const. 1874, art. II, sec. 22). In reaching the conclusion
above announced we are not unmindful of the constitutional
provision, but where no right has been violated there is no
injury for which the liability affords compensation and it
is a case of an injury without damages.' The supreme court
of Mississippi, under a constitutional provision like ours,
where the acts complained of were the acts of its levee commissioners' in controlling the waters of the river whose name
the state bears, has held that the land owner is not entitled
to compensation because the construction of the levee renders
the land between it and the river worthless for agriculture
and necessitates the removal of houses on to the protected side
of the levees. (Richardson v. Levee Oommrs., 68 Miss. 539,
[9 South. 351].)
"Nothing in any of our decisions in the slightest militates
against this conclusion. Reardon v. San Francisco, 66 Cal.
492, [56 Am. Rep. 109, 6 Pac. 317], contains a discussion of
the meaning of the word 'damage' as newly placed in the
constitution. The holding was that it applied to special consequential damages which the owner of adjoining property
received over and above the common injury to other abutters
<m the street or the general public, by reason of a street
improvement. It based its conclusion largely upon the views
of the Supreme Court of Georgia, reference to which has
hereinbefore been made. No difficulty arises over this case,
which by its very language is limited to special damage occa-
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sioned to particular property which is not a common dama ge
to all abutting property. Upon the other hand, in De Baker
v. Southern Oalifornia Ry. 00., 106 Cal. 257, [48 Am. St.
Rep. 237, 39 Pac. 610], this court in Bank, referring to the
contention that because of the modification of our constitution, the doctrine of Green v. Swift, 47 Cal. 536, and Green
v. State, 73 Cal. 29 [11 Pac. 602, 14 Pac. 610], and Lamb v.
Reclamation District, 73 Cal. 125, [2 Am. St. Rep. 775, 14
Pac. 625], were no longer the law, passed it by with the
statement merely that, 'it is possible this may be true.' But
'here and now, therefore, for the first time is the question
presented, and for the reasons above given, we hold that the
doctrine of damnum ,absque injuria is applicable to the prospective temporary consequential damage which it may be
found will be inflicted upon the plaintiffs' lands by the future raising of a flood plane, which floods are of temporary
duration and character, which raising the plaintiffs may protect themselves against, and which floods, in the progress of
the work, will be taken care of so that future injury will
be avoided, all this under the state's plan of vast magnitude
and importance to abate, on behalf of the whole state, as ~'
well as for the benefit of private land owners, including these
plaintiffs, flood conditions, which, if unchecked, would inevitably lead, to the destruction of the navigability of the
river and ,to the greater impairment and damage of all the
adjacent ,.land. Further than this it is not necessary here
tp go." (Emphasis added.)
It should be apparent to anyone familiar with the factual
situation, :in ,:the Gray case that it bears no similarity what~
ever to the' factual situation in the cases at bar and that
therefore :the principles of law involved in that case are in
nowise applicable to the cases now before us.
In the cases at bar the improvement has directly caused
the damage suffered by the plaintiffs. In the Gray case the
improvement instead of causing damage to the plaintiff would
ultimately ,result -in a benefit and improvement of his property;' the damages involved being only prospective and temporary and incidental to the construction of the improvement
rather tJ?,an the improvement itself. Furthermore, as pointed
out by this court in its decision in the Gray case, the plain,tiff, could protect, his property against the prospective temp~rary damage to wlJ.ich his property was subjected, but the

.

c.

Los

ANGELES.

59

(2d) 19]

plaintiffs in the cases at bar obviously had no such opportunity.
I cannot refrain from adverting to the recent but growing tendency of some courts and judges toward the destruction of constitutional guarantees by the process of specious
interpretation. It may be that such constitutional guarantees
are obnoxious to the social or economic philosophy of the
judge or judges deciding the particular cause; but I submit
that it is for the people and not the courts to bring about
changes in our Oonstitution. To invoke the police power
as a justification for the taking or damaging of private property for public use in violation of section 14 of article I of
the Constitution of California is nothing less than amending
the Constitution by judicial edict or nullification by sanction
of law.
In the cases at bar, the public agencies here involved constructed a drainage system presumably for the benefit of the
public, or a portion thereof. Conceding that such system
was properly and efficiently constructed and maintained, but
its operation necessitated the flooding of plaintiffs' premises
situated three miles away, under what possible theory can
it be argued that plaintiffs' property was not damaged for
the public purpose of maintaining said drainage system ~ If
it was so damaged, defendants are liable to plaintiffs under
section 14 of article I of our Constitution. If, on the other
hand, the system was improperly or inefficiently constructed
or maintained, and the flooding of plaintiffs' premises resulted therefrom, the liability of defendants could be predicated upon the provisions of the 1923 statute (Stats. of ] 923,
p. 675, Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937, Act 5618), as well as the
above-mentioned provision of the Constitution. In other
words, defendants could not avoid liability for the damaging
of plaintiffs' property because of their negligent conduct in
the construction or maintenance of the public improvement
if they would be liable therefor notwithstanding such negligent conduct.
Finally, it is stated in the majority opinion that the evidence does not establish that the bridge maintained across
the lagoon by one of the defendants was a contributory cause
of the flooding of pI8,intiffs' lands. I have heretofore set
forth the facts in these cases and they manifestly show that
the bridge blocked the flow of the water and the debris
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thereby caused .to collect was a contributing cause of the
flooding. ' It must be remembered that these cases' are here
0!l, ~pp~al from judgments entered after orders granting nonsuits; and' all the evidence must be viewed and every reasonapl~. inference drawn favorably to plaintiffs. There is un, d'eniablysufficient evidence to require the submission of the
cases
to',t.}~e
jury on that question of fact.
I
" ' ','
.' '.
:;J,mnniingup, we have cases where public agencies, with
no'pr6p~iet'~ry right so to do, have collected surface waters
9Y. the iA~t~llation' of drains, have discharged those waters
'into anatll~al watercourse, and have failed to provide adequate mea:Q.'~' of escape for those waters into the ocean well
knowing' that' their ,'conduct would cause the flooding of
plaintiffs' premises. As a result of that conduct, the waters
discharged in the watercourse' exceeded its capacity and could
not escape through the inadequate outlet, and plaintiffs' land
and the improvements thereon, not riparian to the stream,
being three miles away, and not having theretofore been
subject to overflow by any of the waters, are flooded and damaged. The majority decision is contrary to the firmly established law in California and the weight of authority in other
jurisdictions. I t will not only result in a grievous miscarriage of justice in the cases now under consideration, but will
cause grea~ confusion in the law on the subject here involved.
In my opinion the judgments should be reversed.
~,
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CURTIS, J.-I concur in the conclusion reached in the
dissenting opinion.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied December
12, 1941. Curtis, J., and Carter, J., voted for a rehearing.
Houser, J., did not participate therein. Spence, J., acting
pro tem.
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JAMIE O'HARA et a1., Appellants, v. LOS ANGELES
COUNTY FLOOD, CONTROL DISTRICT, Respondent.
(1] Eminent Domain-Compensation-Necessity for and Right to

-State Constitutional Guaranty.-Compensation for private
property taken or damaged for public use must be mnde under
Const. art. I, § 14, only when the taking or damaging is not
so o~sential to the public health, safety, and morals as to be
justified under the police power and the injury is one which
would give rise to a cause of action by the owner if it were
inflicted by a private person.
Waters - Surface Waters - Protection Against - Confining
Waters-Improvements in Stream-Diversion.-A lower riparian owner has no redress for injury to his land caused by
improvements in the stream when there has been no diversion
of water out of its natural channel.
Id.-Surface Waters-:-Protection Against-Public Improvements - Increasing Velocity of Stream Waters.-A county
flood control district which replaced dikes that bordered upon
a river with concrete levees and constructed a concrete embankment running at right angles to the levees, thereby obstructing the drainage of surface waters into the river, is not
liable to property owners near the river, when due to heavy
rainstorms and an inadequate outlet, the stream waters flowed
at a speed heightened by the improvements, burst through the
banks of the river and damaged the property, and the surface
waters flooded it.
[4] Id.-Surface Waters-Protection Against-Obstructing Flow.
A private landowner may not obstruct the flow of surface
waters that naturally drain aeross, his property from adjoining lands.
[5] Id. - Surface Waters - Protection Against--:-Public Improvements-Right to Obstruct Flow.-A governmental agency in
constructing public improvements may validly exercise its
police power to obstruct the flow of surface waters not running in a natural channel without making compensation for
the resulting damages.
[3] See 27 R. C. L. 1146.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Eminent Domain, § 43 (1); [2J
Waters, §396; [3,5] Waters, §400; [4] Waters, §391; [6] Appeal and Error, § 1431.

